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The truth commission has emerged in the last thirty years as a distinct juridical form that views 
the production of truth as necessary, and in some cases sufficient, for achieving justice. In his 
history of truth-telling in juridical forms, Michel Foucault conducts a genealogy of avowal (or 
confession) in western judicial practice; critical to his definition of avowal is that the truth-teller 
and wrong-doer must be the same individual. In my analysis, I consider avowal in light of a 
relatively recent judicial innovation: the truth commission. This is carried out through use of 
Canada’s Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a particular 
case study. The TRC’s emphasis on the testimony of victims rather than perpetrators means that 
truth-telling and wrong-doing are decoupled in this juridical form, suggesting that avowal is not 
a function of truth commissions according to Foucault’s criteria. Does this mean that truth 
commissions are not involved in truth production? Or perhaps that they are not a juridical form 
in the lineage of those examined by Foucault?  The truth commission is a juridical form that 
Foucault was unable to address because it developed after his death. It is possible that the truth 
commission challenges his core understanding of avowal; however, the truth commission also 
appears to be consistent with trends that he predicted about the role of truth-telling in the modern 
judicial system. 
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La commission de la vérité est apparue dans les trente dernières années sous une forme juridique 
distincte qui voit la production de la vérité comme nécessaire et dans certains cas suffisante pour 
rendre justice. Dans son histoire sur la vérité et les formes juridiques, Michel Foucault mène une 
généalogie d’aveux (ou de confessions) dans la pratique juridique occidentale. Ce qui est critique 
à sa définition d’aveu est que la personne qui dit la vérité et qui agit mal doit être la même. Dans 
mon analyse, je considère l’aveu à la lumière d’une innovation juridique relativement récente : 
la commission de la vérité. Ceci est effectué comme étude de cas particulier pour la Commission 
de la vérité et de la réconciliation relatives aux pensionnats indiens du gouvernement du Canada 
(CVR). La CVR met l’accent sur le témoignage des victimes et non sur celui des auteurs ce qui 
signifie que la personne qui dit la vérité et celle qui agit mal sont dissociés dans cette forme 
juridique, suggérant que l’aveu n’est pas une fonction de la commission de la vérité selon les 
critères de Foucault. Cela signifie-t-il que les commissions ne sont pas engagées envers la 
production de la vérité? Ou, peut-être qu’elles ne sont pas une forme juridique dans la même 
lignée que celles étudiées par Foucault? La commission de la vérité est une forme juridique que 
Foucault n’a pas été capable de traiter car elle s’est développée après son décès. Il est possible 
que la commission de la vérité dévie de sa compréhension de base de l’aveu, cependant, la 
commission de la vérité semble également être cohérente avec les tendances prédites au sujet du 
rôle de la production de la vérité dans le système juridique moderne. 
 














The truth commission has emerged in the last thirty years as a distinct juridical form that sees the 
production of truth as necessary, and in some cases sufficient, for achieving justice. Although some 
scholars address the relationship between truth and reconciliation, focusing on whether it is possible 
to achieve reconciliation via truth (Bachmann, 2010; Clark, 2012; Corntassel and Holder, 2008; 
Twose, 2010), a more fundamental question is what truth commissions mean when they refer to 
‘truth.’ Given the contested territory that ‘truth’ has become in the postmodern era, it is unsurprising 
that truth commissions define it in different ways, with some actively acknowledging truth as a 
multiplicity by identifying and documenting several different kinds (Kashyap, 2009; May, 2013; 
Roosa, 2008). Yet it is difficult to define truth without also considering who has defined it and to 
whom it belongs. Scholars criticize truth commissions on the grounds that they reproduce existing 
power relations while doing little to undermine them, the effect of which is that the truth being told 
is ultimately that of the oppressive state or class (Corntassel and Holder, 2008, French, 2009; 
Garman, 2006; Macias, 2013); while still critical of truth commissions, others acknowledge that 
they can convey the truth of victims in ways that reverse oppressive power dynamics (James, 2012). 
The idea that truth commissions somehow establish truth is an often unquestioned assumption, and 
it may in fact be the case that there is no correspondence between truth commissions and truth 
production. McCalpin (2013) suggests that truth commissions do not necessarily produce truth and 
that some do indeed fail at this ostensibly basic task, and Jeganathan (2010) contends that their 
dependence on victim testimony means that some commissions ultimately render the inadequate 
‘ruins of truth.’ 
 I take these concerns as a starting point for the present discussion by asking how truth is 
defined in truth commissions and ultimately raising the question of whether truth is produced 
through their proceedings. To do this, I rely on Michel Foucault’s Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: 
The Function of Avowal in Justice, a series of lectures delivered in 1981 – although not fully 
published in English translation until 2014. In these lectures Foucault conducts a genealogy of 
avowal as truth-telling in western juridical practice. For Foucault, truth is a product of the power 
dynamics of the institutions that constitute society; truth is bound to social structures and therefore 
constructed within a particular socio-historical context. Truth-telling (or veridiction, which 
includes avowal or confession) is a verbal enunciation in which a subject acknowledges a particular 
truth as authoritative and thereby recognizes the authority and legitimacy of those social institutions 
that produce it (Foucault, 2014, p. 19-21). I begin by dissecting Foucault’s definition of avowal to 
determine the parties necessary for avowal and how each is positioned in relation to the act. I 
demonstrate that, if avowal is to occur and not some other form of veridiction, it is imperative that 
the truth-teller and wrong-doer be the same subject. I then consider how this corresponds to the 
form of veridiction produced by the Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) in Canada. A close reading of the TRC mandate reveals that truth-telling and 
wrong-doing have been decoupled and are consequently enacted by different parties. Does this 
mean that truth commissions are not juridical forms that operate by means of avowal? By situating 
truth commissions in Foucault’s genealogy of avowal I hope to demonstrate that they fit 
genealogically into the history of western justice systems and that, rather than reflecting a 
theoretical need to separate avowal from truth commission, ostensible contradictions point towards 
recent shifts in the justice system of which Foucault seems to have foreseen. 
 Foucault’s definition of ‘avowal’ warrants close attention due to the surprising precision 
with which it is crafted; here, avowal is framed as a reflexive act. Foucault’s genealogical research 
addresses various practices – knowledge, discipline, sexuality, among others – as social 













within a specific place and time, its uses and meanings will vary so greatly that it is nearly 
impossible to provide a precise and unchanging definition.  Accordingly, when Foucault goes to 
lengths to establish a clearly articulated definition of a practice such as avowal, this definition 
presumably carries much gravity and warrants close inspection. In Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, 
Foucault offers what seems to be a clear, integrated, and painstakingly worded definition of 
‘avowal.’ In his succinct definition, Foucault (2014) states: 
 
 …That avowal is a verbal act through which the subject affirms who he is, binds 
 himself to this truth, places himself in a relationship of dependence with regard  
 to another, and modifies at the same time his relationship to himself. (p. 17) 
 
This definition frames avowal as a reflexive act through which one acts upon oneself: through the 
act of avowal one affirms himself, binds himself, places himself, and modifies himself. (I retain 
Foucault’s use of gendered language not just for consistency, but because I suspect it expresses 
something important about the gendered nature of truth and justice). Although avowal may change 
one’s relationship to others, this is not because they have acted upon others, rather it is the effect 
of changing the subject’s relationship to himself. And although the subject can coherently and 
meaningfully say ‘I avow,’ this does not mean that avowal occurs in an intransitive sense; to avow 
is a reflexive verb so that when one says ‘I avow’ what is meant is ‘I avow myself.’ For Foucault, 
avowal cannot be directed towards others nor can it be received from them, as it is defined 
exclusively as a process through which the subject acts upon himself. 
 In an expanded definition, Foucault identifies and develops four distinct characteristics of 
avowal. First, avowal “runs the risk of being costly” and comes at a price to the subject who avows 
(Foucault, 2014, p.16). The untold thing that the subject avows holds “a great value” for the avower 
so that, by making it told, they risk losing something important (Foucault, 2014, p.15). The subject 
cannot avow if he does not pay a certain price for it, and although it is not certain whether he will 
actually pay the full sum, it is the risk of payment that makes avowal such a serious act. Second, 
avowal must be voluntary because it is a statement about the avowing subject. Through the act of 
avowal, the avower “promises to be what he affirms himself to be” (Foucault, 2014, p. 16). 
Precisely because it affirms something about the subject it must originate with him; avowal that is 
coerced and therefore not “necessarily free” does not truly originate with the speaker (Foucault, 
2014, p. 16). Third, avowal takes place within the context of a power relation. Because avowal 
requires both an avower as well as a party to acknowledge the avowal, the avower effectively 
“submits” to the other party and articulates his obedience to the other. Avowal therefore produces 
or maintains “a power relation that exerts itself on the one who avows.” Avowals are ‘costly’ for 
this reason: they require one’s submission to another (Foucault, 2014, p. 16-17). Fourth, avowal 
“ties the subject to what he affirms” and modifies the relationship between the avower and the thing 
they avow. To avow is to identify with the thing that the subject avows, yet the act of identification 
“will modify the relationship between the [avower] and his [wrong-doing]”; the avower becomes 
the act, and in doing so changes their relation to the self as well as that act. This might be perceived 
as a reversal of fortune or a shift in the trajectory of the subject’s healing process (Foucault, 2014, 
p. 17). Foucault (2014) uses Greek tragedy as an example to demonstrate how an act of veridiction 
reveals “the real identity of some hitherto unknown or misknown person” which consequently 
“reverses the good fortune of the characters and transforms happiness into misery or luck into 













 According to this definition, avowal can only occur if it disadvantages the avower in some 
way. The first characteristic of avowal is that the avower must experience it as a loss or potential 
loss; they must pay, concede, or relinquish something they value. The third and fourth 
characteristics explain that this is because the act of avowal changes the subject’s relation to oneself 
as well as to others, and that this change does not benefit the avowing subject. The avower becomes 
something different than the person they used to be, and this new identity does not necessarily place 
them in the sort of privileged position that they may have previously occupied. In fact, it is almost 
certain to place the subject in a subordinate position because it requires them to submit to the will 
of another. For the avowing subject, avowal is always a process through which they lose privilege 
and become disadvantaged, and this precludes the possibility of avowal occurring in contexts where 
a speaker stands to benefit from the act of veridiction. The subject can enact veridiction that is 
voluntary and modifies his relationship to himself and others, but if the subject stands to gain from 
the act—by gaining a dominant position, for example—it cannot be considered avowal. The 
preposition ‘of dependence’ in Foucault’s (2014) concise definition is therefore crucial because it 
signifies that veridiction can have a dramatic effect on the subject’s fortune but, unless that effect 
is for the worse, veridiction is not avowal.  
 Avowal is characterized by a downward turn in the subject’s affairs and this is rooted in 
the notion that avowal acknowledges an act of wrong-doing. The particular acts that are defined as 
‘wrong’ will vary between contexts. The reason for this variation is that ‘wrong’ is always defined 
by and within the context of a particular community. In his core examples of Greek literature and 
Christianity Foucault (2014) shows how ‘wrong’ has varying definitions within diverse 
communities. In the literature of Homer and Sophocles, ‘wrong’ is defined by a community of gods 
but must be recognized by mortal humans. In fourth and fifth century Christianity, ‘wrong’ is 
defined by the subject’s religious community and this leads to the strength of an individual’s 
connection to a monastic community depending upon whether or not they have committed a wrong. 
When a subject commits an act defined as wrong, he effectively undermines the integrity of that 
community and consequently places himself in a subordinate position to that community. 
Subordination is therefore a condition that emerges from the act of wrong-doing, while avowal is 
what acknowledges the wrong-doing and the subject’s wilful submission to the community; avowal 
does not create a subordinate position, but simply recognizes it. Foucault (2014) articulates the 
communal origins of ‘wrong,’ and the relationship between wrong-doing and the subject’s 
recognition of wrong-doing, in the sixth Louvain lecture: 
 
 So what serves as the foundation of the law is the will of all. And, as a  
 consequence, one of the most frequent and most essential themes in the penal  
 theory of the eighteenth century, but also in contemporary penal theory, is the  
 principle that when someone has committed a crime, he himself punishes himself  
 – through the law to which he is supposed to have consented or that he is supposed  
 to support of his own free will...Why, at bottom, is the avowal there? Not only so  
 that the individual might say, ‘Well yes, I committed such and such a crime,’ but  
 so that in saying this, he manifests in a way the very principle of the penal law; he  
 takes on the role of the guilty party and recognizes through his avowal the  
 sovereignty both of the law and the tribunal that will punish him and in which he 














If wrong-doing is subject to some kind of penalty issued on behalf of the community or individual 
who has been wronged—a fine, imprisonment, exile, among others—avowal is confirmation that 
the subject is willing to pay the price. Avowal therefore requires someone who has transgressed, 
deviated, or committed a crime, and it is only this type of subject who may avow. Foucault (2014) 
demonstrates how Oedipus was punished (or rather punished himself) through blindness and exile 
for the transgressions of murder and incest, and also points to how a fourth century Christian 
monastic was punished through exile for the transgression of sin. To summarize, avowal can only 
be enacted by one who has transgressed; avowal can only occur when wrong-doing and truth-telling 
are united in a single party. 
 The dual requirement of transgression and reflexivity is articulated in Foucault’s (2014) 
treatment of the modern judicial process that was institutionalized during the medieval period and 
persisted into the twentieth century (and now twenty-first century, though Foucault did not live 
long enough to make that analysis)  (p. 201-210). This judicial process requires three parties: a 
victim who has been wronged, an accused who purportedly committed the wrong-doing, and a 
judge who evaluates the veracity of those claims made by the two other parties. Through the 
application of various techniques for truth production, the judicial procedure aims to have the judge 
produce truth based on the examination of the relevant parties. Although avowal from the accused 
was initially only able to produce a partial truth, by the nineteenth century avowal from the wrong-
doer alone was sufficient to produce truth. For Foucault (2014), “avowal by the guilty party has 
become a fundamental need of the [judicial] system...because the very foundations of the system 
were put on the table in the case of avowal, and they called for avowal” (p. 209). Avowal is essential 
in modern judicial procedure and institutions because the entire framework of this system is built 
upon the act, although it is not just any avowal that is needed but avowal from the accused party. 
If the accused avows—avowing the crime they committed and the criminal that they are—the judge 
can be certain that the avowing subject recognizes the truth. 
 Since Foucault’s death, the truth commission has emerged as a juridical form that functions 
at the national level but is present on the global scale—a juridical form that I propose complicates 
Foucault’s (2014) understanding of veridiction and avowal. Broadly speaking, truth commissions 
are an approach to transitional justice that tend to be (though not always) established during shifts 
in state structure from an oppressive or authoritarian regime to a liberal or democratic one. Truth 
commissions work to address state crimes against state subjects through the involvement of a series 
of judicial proceedings, institutional reforms, and reparative programs (Hayner, 2011). The explicit 
purpose of a truth commission is to achieve reconciliation and justice by breaking “the silence about 
widely known but unspoken truths” of state crimes (Hayner, 2011, p. 20). This is consistent with 
Foucault’s (2014) description of avowal as the “passing from the untold to the told” (p. 15). 
Proceeding from a series of court cases against the Canadian government by the former students of 
Indian Residential Schools (IRS), Canada established the Indian Residential Schools Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 2008, which concluded its hearings in 2014. In the following 
section, I use truth commissions as a means to illustrate Foucault’s (2014) definition of avowal and 
use the definition to consider the relationship between avowal and the truth and reconciliation 
process. I take the TRC mandate as the particular discourse with which to conduct my analysis 
because the mandate for a truth commission “define[s] the truth that will be documented” (Hayner, 
2011, p. 75). But before addressing how this mandate defines the actors necessary for the truth-
telling process, I first consider power relations in a settler society such as Canada. 
 Although academics accept that power relations in settler societies cannot be reduced to 













societies in terms of binary relations. In particular, two dominant binary constructions are relevant 
to the current analysis: the settler/native pair and the perpetrator/victim pair. The settler/native 
binary views the settler state as occupied by two distinct socio-cultural groups: the settler class 
whose ancestors, usually of European origin, migrated to, settled, and colonized the territory during 
a period of recorded history, and the Indigenous residents of that territory whose ancestors have 
existed there since prehistoric times. Scholars criticize such frameworks as an extreme 
oversimplification, noting for example that most territories have experienced multiple waves of 
migration during both prehistoric and historic times. Additionally, many ‘settlers’ come from 
families who have lived in a territory for generations, and neither group can be viewed as ethnically 
or culturally homogenous. Nevertheless, scholars suggest that, because settler societies are widely 
perceived in popular thought as being characterised by a settler/native binary, the distinction is still 
a methodologically and theoretically useful one to make (See Stasiulis and Jhappan, 1995; 
Mbembe, 2001). 
 The settler/native binary articulates the origin narrative of a settler state, and when paired 
with a perpetrator/victim binary it exposes a distinct power relation. The perpetrator/victim 
construction conceives of the perpetrators as an oppressive group that imposes culture on the 
natives through the process of colonization, with the victims being conceived of as an oppressed 
group who are socially, culturally, and physically controlled by colonial institutions. This binary is 
likewise deconstructed by scholars based on the notion that neither group is fully powerful or 
powerless; members of the oppressive class are oppressed themselves and that oppression is 
intersectional and stratified. When the two binary patterns are combined it becomes clear that there 
is a distinct power relation characterizing settler societies: the settlers are the oppressive 
perpetrators of colonialism and the natives are the oppressed victims. While some theorists accept 
the settler-perpetrator/native-victim binary as overly simplistic, this model is often used as a 
heuristic starting point for analysis of power relations in colonial contexts, and this binary continues 
to regenerate in academic and popular thought (See Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, 1995).   
 Power relations in Canadian society, particularly as they relate to the colonial institutions 
such as IRS and the TRC, are often viewed in terms of a settler/native binary. In Unsettling the 
Settler Within, Regan (2010), a self-identified “non-Indigenous woman [and] colonizer-
perpetrator,” develops a pedagogical framework for the decolonization of Canadian history (p. 24). 
Through examination of the dynamics of IRS and TRC, Regan (2010):  
 
 Argue[s] for a truth-telling dialogue that begins with deconstructing our identity  
 and our myths about the history of Indigenous-settler relations. Within the IRS  
 discourse in Canada, the binary oppositions of colonizer/colonized,  
 oppressor/oppressed, and perpetrator/victim have been reinforced in  
 counterproductive ways. (p. 66) 
 
Regan (2010) recognizes that these binaries are not helpful in the truth-telling and reconciliation 
process and her ultimate goal is to deconstruct and replace them with a model that is less 
antagonistic. However, Regan (2010) also recognises that this deconstructed framework is 
idealistic and does not reflect the contemporary situation as oppositional binaries continue to plague 
colonial thought.  The dominant way of thinking about power relations in Canada views society as 













 In its official mandate, the TRC attempts to deconstruct simplistic understandings of settler 
societies but ultimately lapses into the settler/native binary. From the outset, the mandate 
emphasises the complex and nuanced relations of Canadian society by explaining that: 
 
 Reconciliation is an ongoing individual and collective process, and will require 
 commitment from all those affected including First Nations, Inuit and Métis  
 former Indian Residential School (IRS) students, their families, communities,  
 religious entities, former school employees, government and the people of  
 Canada. Reconciliation may occur between any of the above groups. (Indian  
 Residential Schools Settlement Agreement [IRSSA], 2006, Principles section). 
 
The history and legacy of IRS cannot be understood in terms of a simple settler/native relationship 
because each aspect of the binary is composed of many distinct groups and subgroups. Every group 
has been impacted by residential schools in its own way, so it is possible—and even necessary for 
the reconciliation process—for each group to engage with multiple others. However, the mandate 
quickly slips from a nuanced understanding of reconciliation to a simplified framework. Rather 
than addressing the distinct experiences of the multiple groups involved in the reconciliation 
process, the mandate emphasises “the unique experiences of First Nations, Inuit, and Métis former 
IRS students” (IRSSA, 2006, 4. Exercise of Duties section (a)). Indigenous groups are lumped 
together and imputed with the same ‘unique experience’ that not only fails to address distinctions 
between these groups, but also ignores the ways that others, particularly non-Indigenous groups, 
have been impacted by IRS. Ultimately, the TRC resorts to traditional patterns by depending on a 
distinction “between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians.” (IRSSA, 2006, Principles 
section) 
 Consistent with binary perceptions of power relations in settler societies, the TRC mandate 
constructs Indigenous subjects as the victims of the IRS system. A key principle of the TRC is that 
it takes a ‘victim-centred’ approach to the truth and reconciliation process which should, if one 
believes the mandate principles, include nearly every individual and group in Canadian society in 
one way or another. However, the mandate continues to “recognize that ownership over IRS 
experiences rests with those affected by the Indian Residential School legacy,” suggesting that 
particular groups have been impacted while other have not (IRSSA, 2006, 10. Events section 
(A)(i)). By acknowledging “the injustices and harms experienced by Aboriginal people and the 
need for continued healing” the mandate suggests that it is largely Indigenous people who are 
impacted by IRS (IRSSA, 2006, 10. Events section (A)(i), emphasis removed). Despite that the 
mandate attempts to deconstruct binary patterns related to the legacy of IRS, it reduces Indigenous 
people to a homogenous mass and constructs them as the primary victims of Canada’s colonial 
legacy. 
 Although the TRC retroactively acknowledges IRS as a crime and creates Indigenous-
victims as the object of that crime, it is prevented from defining the perpetrators. The mandate 
clearly indicates that the commission is prohibited from the accusation and judgement of 
perpetrators and that the commissioners must conduct proceedings: 
 
 Without making any findings or expressing any conclusion or recommendation,  
 regarding the misconduct of any person, unless such findings or information has  
 already been established through legal proceedings, by admission, or by public  













 reference in any of its activities or in its report or recommendations to the possible  
 civil or criminal liability of any person or organization, unless such findings or 
 information about the individual or institution has already been established  
 through legal proceedings. (IRSSA, 2006, 2. Establishment, Powers, Duties and 
 Procedures of the Commission section (f)). 
 
In other words, the TRC cannot create criminal subjects. This is significant given that Foucault 
(2014) suggests “by introducing the avowing subject, it was no doubt believed that it could bring 
about the fortunate coincidence between the author of the crime and the subject who had to account 
for it” (p. 200). It is within the criminal that subjectivity, wrong-doing, and avowal are unified. 
Although the mandate explicitly prevents the TRC from identifying the criminal(s) responsible for 
the crime of IRS, the binary logic of the mandate directs the interpreter towards the culpable party; 
by reinforcing the native/settler binary and constructing the native as a victim, the implication is 
that Canada’s settler community constitute the perpetrators. On a political level, prohibiting 
accusation obviously prevents the TRC from attributing guilt to government institutions and 
officials that might later have implications in federal or international courts. On the judicial level, 
this means that there is no accused party to be interrogated, judged, or to avow to the crime. The 
TRC does not deny the existence of a criminal, but is prevented from creating a criminal subject 
who can identify himself and speak his own truth. 
 In the absence of an avowing subject, the task of veridiction is left to the Indigenous-victim. 
One of the primary activities of the TRC is ‘statement taking/truth sharing’ whereby the 
commission “receive[s] statements and documents from former students, their families, community 
and all other interested participants” (2006, Terms of Reference 2a). Through this documentation, 
the TRC “creat[es] a record or statement of...truths, insights and recommendations” which it then 
institutionalizes via “historical research and report[s], national events, and...the research centre” 
(IRSSA, 2006, 10. Events section (B)(d)). In short, the ‘statement taking/truth sharing’ process 
allows the Indigenous community to provide testimonies about the impact of residential schools 
which are then documented as ‘truths’ and integrated into educational, memorial, and political 
institutions. Because the TRC may not identify perpetrators to speak and be judged, it is up to the 
victims to recognize the truth that the TRC produces about the crime of residential schools.  
 To reframe the discussion in Foucauldian terms, the TRC is a modern juridical institution 
much like others in that it produces truth and uses veridiction to produce subjects who recognize it, 
except that truth-telling and wrong-doing have been decoupled in a substantial way. Like other 
judicial procedures, the TRC acknowledges a wronged victim, a perpetrator who has committed a 
wrong-doing, and a judge responsible for handling truth claims. Under the assumption that the IRS 
system was an act of wrong-doing, Indigenous people are considered to be the victims (not just 
former students but their entire communities), and non-Indigenous settlers are the perpetrators.; the 
commission is the judicial power responsible for extracting, documenting, and institutionalizing 
truth statements. However, settlers are not the accused party in a the modern juridical 
conceptualization because, while they are implicitly recognized as criminals, they are not formally 
accused of any wrong-doing; they lack any formal accusation to avow. This does not mean that 
avowal—or truth-telling, at least—is any less central to the activities of the TRC; the production 
of truth through an avowing subject is its raise d’être, but it is formally prohibited from producing 
truths through the avowal of an accused party.  In contrast to the judicial models presented by 













does not necessarily risk anything through the truth-telling process; in the TRC, wrong-doing and 
truth-telling are not enacted by the same person as Foucault’s (2014) definition of avowal suggests. 
 I suggest a few possibilities to explain this discrepancy, although the possibilities I offer 
are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. One possibility is that the TRC does not actually 
produce truth. If the juridical process does indeed require that the one who avows must be the 
transgressor, as Foucault suggests, then any veridiction delivered by a victim does not constitute 
avowal; in this case, testimonies given by victims of IRS do not constitute avowal—they are not 
truth-telling in the juridical sense. But the TRC model is based on the premise that, through the 
documentation and institutionalization of testimonies, its function is veridiction—what Foucault 
calls to as ‘truth-telling’ and the TRC refers to as ‘truth sharing.’ However, just because the TRC 
claims to produce truth does not necessarily mean that this is the case, and truth may not be central 
to the truth and reconciliation process. This complicates the way we consider truth commissions. 
Rather than considering how truth is formulated and whose truth is told, it may be more useful to 
consider whether ‘truth’ is a meaningful idea and, if so, what makes it intelligible. Is the judicial 
system transforming into an institution where concepts of truth and avowal are no longer relevant 
or meaningful? What does this mean for a ‘regime of truth’ in Canadian society? 
 Another possibility is that the TRC, and truth commissions in general, reflect a shift in how 
avowal functions in juridical practice. In his concluding lecture from Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, 
Foucault (2014) briefly addresses the function of avowal in juridical systems since the nineteenth 
century. Modern technologies and knowledges have made it possible to conceive of a crime without 
reason or responsibility—crimes where the ‘criminal subject’ is pathologically deviant and 
therefore cannot avow, or the case of civil liability in which there is no criminal party. The impact 
of this is “so paradoxical that [it has] unsettled in part the penal machine that we now know, or at 
least introduced a series of impasses that, I believe, we are far from overcoming” (Foucault, 2014, 
p. 200). Juridical institutions have been built on the concept of avowal, but other modern 
institutions have since undermined the meaning of avowal. Seeing it as both necessary and 
meaningless, juridical procedure is confused by avowal and does not know how to integrate it into 
the modern system. The function of avowal in truth commissions may reflect this confusion; there 
may not be a criminal to avow but there is still a victim, so perhaps it is the victim who must become 
the avowing subject. Shifting the responsibility of avowal from the wrong-doer to the victim may 
be a way for the juridical system to cope with changes in technology and knowledge.  
 I will avoid claiming that any particular interpretation of the inconsistencies is correct 
because it is more interesting for both reader and writer to be left without closure; each 
interpretation has value depending on one’s perspective. Concluding that Foucault’s (2014) 
definition of avowal is inaccurate, or that my interpretation is incorrect, may be necessary for a 
positivist researcher in need of a clearly defined model, but does not have much value for one 
following the Foucauldian tradition. Questioning whether truth commissions actually produce truth 
is a more provocative question that may be useful for the political activist interested in critiquing 
such institutions. Suggesting that truth commissions reflect a shift in the function of avowal is 
perhaps most consistent with a Foucauldian approach, and leaves the door open for an array of 
other questions concerning truth commissions and contemporary juridical practice. After all, my 
analysis focuses on a very specific piece of discourse that established the framework for the TRC 
but does not address the larger context in which the commission operates; much has occurred in 
the TRC since the mandate was issued in 2006 and I have been unable to address such developments 













wider context will provide further insights about truth commissions as a form of restorative justice 
and avowal in contemporary judicial process. 
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